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WUNDT'S DOCTRINE OF PSYCHICAL ANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS, AND SOME RECENT CRITICISM.

II. FEELING AND FEELING-ANALYSIS.

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It is important, in order correctly to interpret Wundt's later theory of feeling, that we clearly understand his position on the subject in his two earliest works. That position may, like the theory of perception which it accompanies, be described as epistemological.

In the *Beiträge*, as has already been explained, the pure sensation is the original element, and the perceptive process is a series of unconscious judgments or inferences.¹ As a result of such unconscious judgment, feeling and sensation in the stricter sense are distinguished as respectively the subjective and objective moments in the pure sensation. This distinction is therefore not original, but the result of reflection. It appears only with self-consciousness and the distinction of the self from its objects. To it no real separation in the pure sensation corresponds, but only a tendency of the stimulus rather to produce an objective impression than a feeling of change in the organ of perception, if the sensation is predominantly objective; or the opposite tendency if it be predominantly subjective.² The *Vorlesungen* merely amplify this treatment. Sensations and feelings are both based on an unconscious 'logical' process, and the distinction between them is not a distinction in this process, but in the ends to which they are directed. Feeling is directed to an activity of the subject, sensation to the knowledge of objects. Sensations have the end of knowledge; but we not only know objects, we are also attracted or repelled by them. Feelings are, therefore, an essential part of our physical life, and give to it its color. They all refer to an activity or passivity, to some state, of the self. The distinction between feeling and sensation is contemporary with, and due to, that between subject and object.³

Here, then, feelings are distinguished from sensations, as the result of an unconscious judgment, in the process of distinction of subject from object. The *psychological* basis of this distinc-

¹*Beiträge*, 424, 437, etc.

²*O. c.* 398-400.

³*Vorl.*, II, 1-5, 15-16.

tion is that the feelings are 'subjective' in character, while the sensations are 'objective.' The *physiological* basis is a peculiarity in the process in the end organ which tends to make it an object of attention for itself, in the case of feeling; or, in that of sensation, to cause it to be comparatively unattended to in the interest aroused rather by the 'objective impressions' which it mediates.¹

When we come to the first edition of the *Physiologische Psychologie*, the epistemological distinction has disappeared. Wundt renounces it by name, in a passage which reappears in all the succeeding editions until the fifth. Here it is dropped, probably because Wundt felt that his revision of the *Vorlesungen*, with its explicit disclaimer of his earlier theory of perception, was sufficient. It is important that we see clearly what he means to abandon in this passage, and what not. The sentence reads as follows: "I must, finally, point out, as a conception *partly* belonging to the epistemological view (of feeling), that which I myself once advocated, according to which feeling is everywhere based on an unconscious process of inference, by which the change in our inner state aroused by sensations or ideas is defined as *subjective* (*Vorlesungen über die Menschen und Thierseele*, Bd. 2.)."²

According to this, then, the earlier theory of feeling was only in part epistemological, and that which made it so was its appeal to an unconscious judgment discriminating between subject and object. That this is Wundt's meaning is clear from the fact that he still continues, especially in the second and following editions of the *Physiologische Psychologie*, to distinguish feelings and sensations as 'subjective' and 'objective.' The second edition of the *Vorlesungen*, while its preface definitely disclaims all the matter in the first which it has omitted, reproduces all the passages in it which contain this distinction. It appears then that 'subjective' and 'objective' have for Wundt some psychological meaning. They correspond to some introspective distinction, and what that is we must look to their further application to discover.

We find at once a considerable advance in clearness of treatment in passing to the first edition of the *Grundzüge*. The pure sensation is the primitive element, and in it we distinguish intensity, quality, and feeling-tone.³ But the feeling is not, like the two attributes, an original and independent constituent

¹ This physiological difference is, of course, not a new theory. Cf., e. g., F. D. E. Schleiermacher, *Psychologie*, 63 ff. (ed. by George, *Sämmt. Werke*, VI.)

² *Phys. Psych.*, 460; 2nd ed., I, 496; 3d, I, 540; 4th ('partly' omitted), I, 593.

³ *Phys. Psych.*, 273.

of consciousness. In the first place, it is determined by the intensity and quality of the sensation. In the second, the feeling-tone disappears, when we consider the sensation by itself, without reference to the consciousness into which it enters, while from intensity and quality we cannot abstract without destroying the sensation. Feeling is, then, a third aspect super-added upon sensation in so far as it stands in relation to consciousness; or, it *is* this relation. We call it sense-feeling or feeling-tone. All sensations have some degree of feeling-tone, and those in which it is prominent we call (sensory) feelings, while those which have little of it are called sensations in the narrower sense.¹

The second edition points out that, while there can be no feeling without sensation, there must be, because of the indifference-zone, some sensations without feeling.² (The first, p. 273, admits this only as a theoretical possibility.) Its important advance, however, is in defining *what* conscious relation constitutes feeling.

Feeling is insufficiently defined by referring it to the general state of consciousness, for sensation "in all its constituents must be conceived as a reaction of our consciousness."³ Quality and intensity, no less than feeling, can be conceived as subjective reactions of consciousness upon certain forms of outer stimulus. The process underlying feeling is therefore not separable from that underlying sensation. It is nearer the truth to say that in the indivisible whole, a sensation of fixed quality, intensity, and feeling-tone, the latter represents the *constituent in the case of which we are not immediately impelled to refer to objective relations of the stimuli*. In reality sensation, while unanalyzable, is not a simple process either physically or psychically. The *mode of apperception* is an inseparable constituent of all the sensations which we can psychologically examine. Accordingly sense-feeling is immediately comprehensible when we think of it as "*the mode of reaction of the apperceptual activity upon the sense-excitation*." Hence the influence of the general state of mind upon feeling-tone, and the more subjective significance which we give to it, and also its reference to will.⁴

Briefly, then, the theory of the first period^{*} holds that there is but one class of elements, sensations. Feeling is a third attribute of most of these, and represents their subjective aspect. More specifically, it corresponds to or is the mode of reaction of attention upon sensational content. The way in which a perception is taken up into consciousness at large determines feeling. Feeling thus depends on the general sub-

¹ *O. c.* 426-427, 273.

² *O. c.* I, 272, 465.

³ *O. c.* I, 466.

⁴ *O. c.* I, 491-492.

jective disposition in a way which is not true of quality and intensity. Its poles are pleasantness and unpleasantness.

The only material in the second period which concerns our present problem is found in the two articles, *Ueber psychologische Methoden*, and *Zur Lehre vom Willen*, in the *Studien* of 1883. In the first, we have merely the indication that there is now for Wundt a problem of feeling-analysis.¹ In the second, quality and intensity of feeling are mentioned for the first time, and its close relation to will is emphasized. Pleasure and pain, in the form of desire and repulsion, govern all volition. Feeling is on the one hand inseparable from sensations and ideas, and on the other it could not exist without a will the tendency of which it manifests.² These articles, then, show that Wundt was moving toward the position of the third period, where feeling appears as an independent element.³

This position is defended for the first time in the *System der Philosophie*, 1889. Inner experience is, we are here told, a manifold of ideational processes, with which feelings are inseparably connected. We directly relate these feelings, as subjective, to the connected ideas, thought of as objective. Since feelings can never be thought of as *objects*, as the ideas can, it is an unavoidable tendency of the naïve consciousness to make them part of the ideas, especially of those which concern the body and its movements, and finally independent ideas themselves. The ambiguous use of the word *Empfindung* has assisted in this perversion of the facts of inner experience. Modern psychology has restricted the word to the elementary unanalyzable constituents of consciousness, and, in a narrower sense, to the elements of ideas. As such, sensations have intensity and quality as attributes. We also speak of the *feeling-tone* of sensations, by which we imply that every sensation has a relation to our own action and passion. This relation, however inseparable from the sensations, is not objectified along with them, nor does it vary in like measure with their intensity or quality. It therefore cannot, with these, be classed as a third fundamental attribute of sensations. Hence the attempt to reduce all feelings and feeling-complexes to feeling-tone of sensations is invalid, and its absurdity becomes evident as soon as an attempt is made to explain in this way the affective result of such a complex as a work of art.

Immediate experience has, therefore, as its content objective

¹ *Studien* I, 5-6.

² *O. c.* 344, 349-350.

³ As before, the 3d and 4th eds. of the *Phys. Psych.* reproduce the treatment of the 2nd.

ideas and accompanying subjective circumstances. The first task of psychological analysis is, then, to discover the last elements of these two constituents of experience. We may restrict the name *sensations* to the elements of the first, and call the elements of the second *simple feelings*. The separating abstraction is difficult in the case of feeling, because it has not the reference to an object which permits the definite isolation of the idea as an object of attention. Feeling is always attached to some perceptual content, and is particularized only by such a connection. Will, like feeling, always appears in intimate connection with idea and sensation; but the absence of identity between them is established by the fact that the same sensational content may appear without the will, and that a will of the same character may attach itself to an entirely different content.

Simple feelings, like elementary sensations, are "primitive facts of consciousness" not to be derived from anything beyond their immediate presence there.¹

It follows, then, that the content of consciousness divides into acts of will, feeling, and ideation. The three are never separated. Ideation is objective, feeling is a subjective reaction on the ideas, based on the volitional activity of the subject. Pleasure and pain are its chief directions, corresponding to the chief directions of the will.²

Wundt's reasons for separating feeling as an independent element, as they appear in the course of his discussion here, may be put under four heads, which have already been mentioned in another connection. (1) Feeling "is not objectified with" sensation. (2) Experience as a whole has an objective and a subjective side; feelings are the elements of the latter, sensations of the former. (3) The feeling attached to a sensation does not vary in like measure with its intensity or its quality, and is not, therefore, like them an attribute of the sensation. (4) While feeling or will is always attached to *some* sensation or ideational content, the connection is not invariable; the same content may appear without the feeling, or a like feeling may attach itself to a different content.

The last two of these reasons, as was pointed out in the previous paper, amount to *independent variability* in the sense in which it was there defined as the test of an element. The first two contain the same 'objective-subjective' distinction which we found used in the first period. As there, so here, Wundt fails to specify the psychological meaning of this distinction.

The chief directions of feeling are still the pleasant and the unpleasant, and as yet there is no mention of the great variety

¹ Syst. d. Phil., 380-387.

² O. c. 562-565.

of its qualities as compared with those of sensation. It is immediately referred to the will, but this connection is not new, as the will is with Wundt equivalent to apperception or attention.¹

Concerning the method of feeling-analysis, we find the statement that feeling, since it has no reference to an object, cannot be isolated as an object of attention.² It can, however, be particularized by its connection with a sensational substrate. That is to say, this perceptual content can be isolated, and in this way the feeling attached to it may also be separated from the total feeling-content of that moment.

It involves some repetition to reproduce all of Wundt's discussion of the present subject in the article *Zur Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen*. But it seems best, at the risk of tedium, to afford the reader every opportunity to examine his terminology in its various contexts.

His primary definition here is, that sensations are the not further analyzable qualitative elements of ideas, in abstraction from the connections in which they always occur, and feeling is the subjective reaction, as pleasure or pain, upon sensation or idea, which expresses our inward relation to the external excitations.³ The ideas are the objective portion of inner experience. The subjective conditions may be divided into two classes, the feelings and the emotions. The latter cause a noticeable change in the train of ideas. When we abstract in the case of any given emotion from this change, a feeling always remains to which the change was due. The feelings, therefore, must be regarded as the more simple processes. They are essential elements of every emotion, but not every feeling leads to an emotion. The emotion is also connected with concomitant physiological phenomena, which are either absent or very weak in the case of feeling. Feeling is thus the simple element of all emotive processes, as sensation is of all ideational processes,—not further to be defined or analyzed. There is, however, a distinction, in that the conditions of sensation are also sim-

¹ Cf. *Studien*, I, 350 and *Logik*, 2d ed., II, 2, pp. 164-168.

² This is the invariable teaching of Wundt. There is, however, a passage in §12, 4a, of the *Grundriss*, which, as translated at p. 162 of the first English edition, seems to contradict it. Here we are told that under certain conditions "the concentration of the attention upon it can generally make any partial feeling whatever predominant." Comparison of the first German edition at pp. 190-191, however, shows that the 'it' of the English version is ambiguous, while the original is quite clear. The attention is directed upon "den eigenen subjectiven Zustand" (*i. e.*, as the context shows, the sensational substrate of the composite feeling), and "in diesem Falle hat dann zugleich diese Richtung der Aufmerksamkeit meist die Eigenschaft, ein beliebiges Partialgefühl zum bevorzugten machen zu können."

³ *Studien*, VI, 337.

ple, while those of feeling are most varied and intricate. Feeling is determined both by the ideational content and by the whole condition of consciousness. It is, therefore, capable of infinite variation, and because of its indefinability we can describe any particular feeling only by a reference to the psychological conditions of its origin and to its effect upon the ideational process.¹

Feelings are most intimately associated with the act of apperception. The only justification for our separating them is the fact that they may greatly vary while the effect of apperception upon the ideational content remains the same. The simplicity which we find in feelings, in spite of the complication of their originating conditions, may be referred to the unity of conscious life in the act of apperception.²

This article, then, gives us no further explanation of the psychological meaning of objective and subjective. The remark that feeling expresses our inward relation to the external excitation merely points out the problem. All that is new is the insistence upon the infinite variety of feeling, the explanation of this by the fact of its dependence both on perceptual substrate and on total disposition, and the reference of the simplicity of feeling to the unity of apperception.

Neither is anything new to be found in the second edition of the *Vorlesungen*. Its importance in this connection, as we have already remarked, lies in the fact that it reproduces all the 'subjective-objective' passages of the first edition, while decidedly repudiating its epistemologising tendencies.³ We pass over the fourth edition of the *Physiologische Psychologie* for the same reason.

The article *Ueber psychische Causalität* in the tenth volume of the *Studien* adds nothing to our definitions, but contains a criticism of psychological theories of feeling which seems to show that one meaning in which Wundt uses the term 'subjective' is lack of correlation with any definite physical stimulus. All ideas are more or less intimately connected with *value-determinations*, sensuous, æsthetic, ethical, or intellectual, for which, or for the influence which they exert on the course of mental life, any parallel or analogue on the physical side is lacking. This is because value-predicates are not applicable to physical processes considered apart from the subject. In so far as physical distinctions accompany the psychical here, as in sensuous feelings they demonstrably do, they lack any peculiarity by which one could account for their psychical value. Attempts to explain such feelings by physiological distinctions—for example, the explanation of pleasure as due to

¹O. c. 358-360.

²O. c. 365.

³Cf. *Vorl.*, 15, 224 ff., 238-239.

the biological value of its stimulus—are only a relegation to the physical side of the value-predicate observed on the psychical.¹ Such an outcome is characteristic of the explanations of materialistic psychology, which all agree in reducing psychical to physiological processes. This reduction may be in the first place to simple sensations, and through them to outer or inner physiological stimuli; or, when the processes are too complicated to admit of this, they may be reduced to *concomitant excitations* (*Miterregungen*) and to physiological nerve-connections as their source. Reflex movement and the accompanying sensation are given as the typical example of such a concomitance. (This seems to be directed against James.) Some psychologists think that the simple sensations suffice, others call in the concomitant excitations. But all materialistic psychologists agree in the tendency to exchange the psychical process for some tangible, but usually hypothetical, physical process.²

The third period ends, in the second edition of the *Logik*, by the first explicit discussion of the method of feeling-analysis. As we saw in the previous paper, the *Logik* sets up two criteria for the element, besides the general condition of analysis: that of non-decomposability, and that of possible isolation as an object of attention. This second criterion cannot be met by feelings, for they vanish when the sensation is 'thought away.' They cannot, therefore, be called *independent* elements in the same sense as the sensations. There have been attempts to make them so, either by making them a specific class of sensations, or else by holding that pleasantness and unpleasantness are individual unchanging feeling qualities, instead of mere class-notions. Such attempts simply contradict the plain facts, and the men who assert that these positions are borne out by their introspections do not deserve to be argued with. It is a mere dogmatic prejudice that all subjectively unanalyzable constituents of consciousness must be possible isolated objects of attention. There are simple unanalyzable feelings, but they cannot be isolated in the same way as sensations, because they have no objective reference. The methods of feeling-analysis differ, therefore, from those of sensation-analysis, and are more difficult to apply.³

Because of this difficulty, psychologists too often have recourse to unaided introspection in this field, which usually means that they accept such dogmatic prejudices as those of the sensationalistic and dualistic theories, against which Wundt does not deign to argue, at least not here. Such unaided in-

¹ *Studien*, X, 46.

² *O. c.* 57-58, 84.

³ *Logik*, II, 2 (*der Geisteswissenschaften*), 198-199.

trospction has the further difficulty that it cannot, with certainty, separate all ideational contents from the affective. The only certain method is, therefore, the experimental variation of the conditions, the method of *impression*, the essential feature of it being that it allows the change of only one of the elements in a complex phenomenon at a time. Since the results of the method of *expression* are physiological, it must be classed among the auxiliary physiological methods. However, it has an indirect psychological value, since it aids analysis.

Three special difficulties of feeling-analysis are indicated. Its most important forms can be genetically investigated only in folk-psychology. Its conditions are immensely complicated, and include indirectly, through association, the whole past history of consciousness. Finally, there is an extreme paucity in feeling-nomenclature; the names we have are merely generic, such as pleasantness and unpleasantness.¹

The third period has, then, thrown some light upon Wundt's theory of feeling-analysis. We cannot, it is true, isolate feelings in the same way as we do sensations; but we can indirectly isolate them *from each other* by the isolation of their perceptual substrate,—given, of course, invariable subjective attitude. This method of indirect isolation, which is pointed out in the *System der Philosophie*, would seem to be the necessary preparation for the feeling-analysis proper described in the *Logik*. The feeling and the perceptual content which arouses it being thus isolated, we discover whether the feeling is simple by varying, one at a time, the elements in that content. If the components in the feeling-reaction vary as a result, or some of them drop out or are added, the feeling is of course not simple. If, however, the feeling is found to disappear or change in its entirety by the alteration of a single element in the perceptual stimulus (once that stimulus has been precisely defined by elimination), then it is simple. This seems to be what Wundt means, and it implies that when the perceptual substrate of a feeling is itself an elementary sensation, then the feeling attached to it is (psychologically) unanalyzable and simple. This question will come up for further discussion later on.

Nothing explicit, however, has been done in the way of giving some psychological meaning to 'subjective.' Wundt has established simple feelings as elements because, like sensations, they can be independently experienced in varying relations, while themselves unanalyzable. What justifies him in making them a *different* class of elements is still their 'subjectivity' as contrasted to sensational 'objectivity.' As we have pointed out, there seems to be some ground to hold that one

¹ *O. c.* 215-223.

connotation of the term is lack of correlation with definite physical stimulus. Very analogous to this is the reference, which has been implicit from the first, to total disposition of consciousness as against particular perceptual experience. But as yet we have no clear connection of the term either with these or with any other introspective description.

This description is supplied in the first edition of the *Grundriss der Psychologie*. The book is important both for this reason and because it gives the first full statement of the final development of Wundt's theory of feeling. It is necessary, therefore, to examine its treatment carefully.

The two classes of elements, sensations and simple feelings, correspond "to the two factors present in immediate experience, the objective contents and the experiencing subject." Both sensations and feelings possess the attributes of quality and intensity.¹ They differ as to certain attributes connected with the immediate relations of sensations to objects, and of feelings to the subject. (1) The qualities of sensation move between maximal differences; those of feeling, between maximal opposites. (2) Simple feelings are much more numerous and various than simple sensations, because (a) "every sensation of the many-dimensional systems belongs at once to several series of feelings," and more especially because (b) simple feelings appear as the subjective complements not only of simple sensations, but also of ideas and of ideational complexes. (3) Sensations fall into separated disparate systems, feelings form a single connected manifold, for every feeling has some qualitative relation to every other feeling. This third difference shows that the origin of feeling is more unitary than that of the sensations. It is the same distinction as that between the unitary subject and the plurality of objects.²

This seems explicit. If this third difference is the same distinction as that between subject and objects, then what Wundt means by 'subjective' is, psychologically, the unitariness, the connectedness, of the affective side of experience. That this is the case is, we think, made clear by a passage which immediately follows.

Since, says Wundt, we can isolate sensations from feelings, but never feelings from sensations, we cannot speak of *pure* feelings as we can of pure sensations, and the false view may arise that sensations are the cause of feelings, or that feelings are a particular class of sensations. The first view cannot be held, because feelings always derive from the attitude of the subject, so that the same sensation may be accompanied, under different subjective conditions, by different feelings. The

¹*Outlines* (1st English ed.), 28-30.

²*O. c.* 33-35, 81-82.

second view is also untenable, because "the two classes of elements are distinguished, on the one hand by the immediate relation of sensations to objects and of feelings to the subject, and on the other by the fact that the former range between maximal differences, the latter between maximal opposites."¹

Now in the passage quoted Wundt obviously uses the subjective-objective criterion as entirely equivalent to the third difference in his list. He is quoting the two differences of feeling as such from sensation as such, and they are given in the first and third of his list of distinctions; the second in the list is merely an external mark derived from the peculiar nature of feeling-conditions, not a specific difference. The first difference in the list he quotes precisely; the other formula may therefore be regarded as equivalent in meaning to the third, and our previous conclusion is made certain.

The 'subjective' nature of feelings, therefore, means their connectedness, their tendency to fuse together; the fact, as Wundt puts it, that they form a *single* system, and that an interconnected manifold, in which every feeling is in some way related to every other, while sensations fall into a number of disparate systems. This agrees perfectly with the hints of Wundt's meaning which we have come upon already. The syncretistic tendencies of feelings, the impossibility of grouping them in definite systems, has as its psychophysical parallel the lack of correlation with definite physical stimulus, and as its psychological the reference to total conscious disposition instead of to particular perceptual experience. It also explains why he has repeatedly said that attention cannot isolate a feeling as its object because feeling 'has no objective reference.' What he meant was, that a feeling is not definitely marked off by its dependence on a particular kind of physiological stimulus, or by its place in a particular modality of experience.

This being granted, then, let us proceed with our review. Wundt has shown that it cannot be maintained, either that sensations are the causes of feelings, or that feelings are themselves sensations. "Because of the objective and subjective factors belonging to all psychical experience, sensations and feelings are to be looked upon as real and equally essential, though everywhere interrelated, elements of psychical phenomena."² The other possibility, that feeling might be a third attribute of sensation, is disproved by the fact that the affective tone of a sensation changes in *both* quality and intensity for every change in either quality or intensity of sensation.³

Simple feelings attached to simple sensations are easily iso-

¹ O. c. 37.

² L. c.

³ O. c. 78.

lated from their connection by the same method which isolates the sensations; but those belonging to complexes "can never be separated from the feelings which enter into the compound as subjective complements of the sensation." For example, the feeling of harmony connected with a chord can never be dissociated from the feelings attached to the single notes of the chord.¹

Sense-feeling cannot exist without the sensation, nor has each given sensation a given feeling. Feeling depends on sensation *and* disposition. There is, therefore, a double abstraction involved in getting at the sense-feeling. The feeling must be distinguished from the concomitant sensation, and also, as unvarying, from all the other feelings connected with that sensation under varying conditions. This second abstraction is very difficult, because the associative factors are always present. Because of this difficulty some psychologists have disbelieved in the existence of any pure affective tone of sensation, and hold that the affection is always due to the associated ideas. But experiments in color sensation show the contrary, for the affective tone of color is greatest when its saturation is strongest, and it is most unlike the colors of familiar natural objects. The uniform choice of particular musical tones to express particular feelings is another disproof of this theory.²

Every sensation in a multidimensional system has an associated feeling which is "a resultant of the affective elements due to its position in various dimensions." The discrimination between simple and composite feelings, therefore, cannot be carried out. Both are alike irreducible. The union of some feelings "gives rise to feelings which are not only unitary, but even simple in character."³

There are three *chief directions* of feeling in the feeling-manifold: pleasantness-unpleasantness, excitement-depression, strain-relaxation. Any concrete feeling may belong to all three, to two, or to only one of these. Organic sensations, smell, and taste, arouse especially feelings of the first direction; color and clang sensations, those of the second; those of the third are connected with the temporal course of processes, as for example the feelings of expectation and of satisfaction. We may assume that these three directions "depend on the relations in which each single feeling stands to the *whole succession of psychical processes*." A feeling has a place in the first in so far as it represents the state of the present moment; in the second, in so far as it exerts a definite influence on the succeeding state; in the third, in so far as it is determined by the preceding state. Such a connection makes it improbable that

¹ *O. c.* 74-75.

² *O. c.* 29, 75-77.

³ *O. c.* 79-82.

other such chief directions exist. These directions also enable us to find in the affective elements the antecedents of the fundamental forms of the emotions. Finally, Wundt concludes his discussion by the remark that the sensationalistic and dualistic theories are beneath criticism.¹

This first edition of the *Grundriss* adds much to our knowledge of Wundt's doctrine of feeling. Here for the first time we find the three directions of feeling, and their connection with the temporal course of consciousness. Here, too, is added an important distinguishing character of feeling not noticed before, that of movement between maximal qualitative opposites. Most important of all, what has hitherto been referred to as the *subjective* character of feelings is given a psychological meaning. This is, that feelings form a single interconnected manifold, all feelings are qualitatively related, while sensations fall into disparate systems. Nothing new is said concerning feeling-analysis, but the statement that simple and composite feelings are alike irreducible when they attach to a simple sensation shows that Wundt recognizes the implication in his theory of analysis which we pointed out a few pages back.

The only new thing in the second edition of the *System der Philosophie* is that it relates the three feeling-directions to the temporal course of consciousness in terms of *will*. In the pleasantness-unpleasantness components, a given direction of will is qualitatively specified; in the excitement-inhibition, the degree of energy of will is indicated; in the strain-relaxation, the particular stage of the volitional process is defined.²

Such changes as appear in the fourth and fifth editions of the *Grundriss* are all in the direction of increased caution. The statement that "the union of certain feelings gives rise to feelings which are not only unitary, but simple in character," is omitted in the fourth edition.³ The connection of the three directions of feeling with the three aspects of consciousness has disappeared. This is probably the most important change. The reference to dualistic and sensationalistic theories of feeling as beneath criticism has gone, and in its place appears a brief statement of reasons for rejecting them. They are either entirely inadequate to deal with the problems of complex emotions, or else meet them by substituting reflections for feelings, as in the intellectualistic explanations of æsthetic pleasure. The supposition that the six classes of feeling-qualities, which appear as the poles of the feeling-directions, "are themselves simple, concrete qualities," while it seems to be supported by the introspection of hypnotized subjects (*cf.* Vogt), is contra-

¹ *O. c.* 82-85.

² *Syst. d. Phil.*, 373.

³ *Cf. Grundr.*, 4th ed., 91 with *Outl.*, 1st ed., 82.

dicted by the feeling-phenomena attached to colors and tones. These differ not only in quantity but also in quality. The quieting effect of sky-blue is not quite that of indigo-blue, the pleasure aroused by the interval of the third is not the same as that aroused by that of the fifth. Nor does it seem possible to account for such differences by assuming the admixture of another feeling. The lack of terms for such finer shades of feeling is no argument against their existence, for such a lack exists also in the case of sensations, though to a much less degree.¹

In the fifth edition, the phrase "objective contents of experience" is substituted for "objects" in the clause "the immediate relation of sensations to objects and of feelings to the subject."² This connection is in line with the psychological definition of this contrast which Wundt has now given. The feelings arising from the fusion of sense-feelings, as the sensations to which they attach are united in ideational complexes, are not called "simple" in character, but "subjectively unanalyzable," "unanalyzable in themselves." The test of invariability under varying conditions, as marking the feeling-tone of simple sensations, is not mentioned. As originally stated, it was plainly at variance with Wundt's whole doctrine of feeling. The statement is also expunged that the feeling attached to a sensation of a multidimensional system, though composite because of its place in the several dimensions, is "as irreducible as a feeling of originally simple nature."³ One's general impression from these changes is that Wundt is now inclined to believe that the feeling-tone attached to some simple sensations may be analyzable because of the possible independent variation in the components of the sensation. For example, we may vary independently brightness, saturation, and color-tone of a color, and thus perhaps establish a division between constituents of its feeling-tone, if it happens to be really not a unitary fusion.

Full as the treatment of feeling is in the fifth edition of the *Physiologische Psychologie*, it adds little but development and confirmation to what has already been outlined as Wundt's general theory of the feeling-elements. Still, it is necessary to examine it with some care, since it is in all probability his final pronouncement on the subject.

¹ *Grundr.*, 4th ed., 94-95.

² Cf. *Grundr.*, 5th ed., 45, with *Outl.*, 1st ed., 37 and *Grundr.*, 4th ed., 40.

³ Cf. *Grundr.*, 5th ed., 92, 99 with *Outl.*, 1st ed., 74, 82; 76; 79; and *Grundr.*, 4th ed., 86, 88 (and 91, which prepares the change at 99 of the 5th ed.).

The composite psychical processes fall into objective and subjective classes, Ideas and Emotions.¹ Accordingly, psychological analysis points out two classes of elements: "sensations, the ultimate unanalyzable elements of ideas, which we accordingly may call the *objective* elements of psychic life, and *feelings*, which accompany these objective elements as their subjective complements, not referred to external things, but to the conditions of consciousness itself."² That is, "in the inseparable whole which we call a sensation of fixed quality, intensity, and feeling-tone, the latter represents the constituent which we conceive as the *subjective* reaction of consciousness upon our impressions, while we assign to (the impression) the intensity and quality of the sensation as its objective attributes."³ Simple sensations and feelings are then the *irreducible* elements of experience. The task of psychology is not to attempt to derive them from some common middle thing which we never experience, but to show their general relations. They appear as the complementary elements of psychic life, representing its objective and subjective sides, since it is made up of the "experiences of experiencing subjects." "Feeling-tone is accordingly in so far a necessary complement of sensation, as each sensation belongs to a sensing (*empfindend*) subject." It stands as a subjective factor beside the objective, to express the relation of the subject to the impression. This difference shows itself immediately in the fact that we objectify our sensations but not our feelings, which we conceive rather as our own subjective experiences, the reactions of our consciousness upon the objective impressions given in sensations.⁴

These passages have been purposely given *in extenso*. They certainly, at first glance, seem very epistemological in character, but we must remember that if our previous understanding of him was justified, all Wundt can mean by this distinction of objective and subjective is just the difference between those parts of experience which we can definitely particularize in attention, and those which, whether because of their functional interdependence with the attentional process or for some other reason, we cannot so separate. If we look at the actual differences between sensation and feeling, which the *Psychologie* in various passages indicates, this is, it seems, what they all centre in, here as elsewhere.

In the first place, then, the physical conditions of sensation are for the most part external and obvious in the organism, while those of feeling are hidden and complicated.⁵ But more especially, the psychical attributes of sensation are much sim-

¹ *Phys. Psych.*, (6) I, 344.

² *O. c.* I, 14, 350.

³ *O. c.* I, 354.

⁴ *O. c.* II, 356.

⁵ *O. c.* I, 353.

pler, being only, in general, intensity and quality, while feeling has various additional characteristics. (1) *Feelings move in contrasts* (*i. e.*, between opposites).¹ (2) They form a single interconnected manifold. There is a *general relationship* of feelings which are referable to wholly heterogeneous objective sensations. All sensations may arouse pleasantness or unpleasantness, may excite or depress us. Hence the feelings are the chief source of the connections and relations in our mental experience.² (3) The feelings present at any moment always tend to fuse into a *total feeling* expressing the collective feeling-content of consciousness at that moment. For this reason the simple feelings are difficult to fix upon, for they fuse into partial feelings, and partial feelings fuse into total.³ This tendency of feelings to fuse, and the connectedness of the feeling-continuum in general, is to be explained by the fact that every feeling is "a reaction of apperception upon the single conscious experience;" for the unity of consciousness is due to apperception.⁴ (4) Finally, and as a result of all these characteristics, feelings cannot be attended to for themselves as sensations can.⁵

Now these characteristics of feeling, taken together, only recapitulate those marks of its subjective character which we have found indicated elsewhere. That is to say, feeling is not correlated with definite physical stimulus, it is to be referred to the totality of consciousness, it refuses to be grouped into definitely separate forms, and, finally, as the result and summing-up of all these qualities, it is always falling into unitary masses, it forms a single continuum. This, then, we may take as Wundt's final meaning in psychology for *subjective*.

The refusal of the sensationalists to accept this separation between feelings and sensations Wundt meets by the assertion that their doctrine is not really psychological, but due on the one hand to the influence of Herbartian intellectualism, and on the other to that of the physiology of sense-perception. The psychologists who hold it demand that there shall be only *one* kind of element, that produced by the stimulation of definite sensory nerves or of their end-organs. This demand is stated as a necessary dogmatic presupposition; it is also stated as a result of immediate introspection (Ziehen, Münsterberg). But

¹ *L. c.*² *O. c.* I, 353; II, 308.³ *O. c.* II, 308, 341.

⁴ *O. c.* II, 341, 357. We may add in passing that we are unable to find in these passages, which are those cited by Dr. Washburn, *Phil. Rev.*, Jan., 1905, p. 21, any justification for her statement there that Wundt refers the unity of feeling to the *physiological* unity of the apperception-centre. At II, 360-362, he hazards the surmise that the connectedness of the expressive movements of affection, vascular and otherwise, may be due to such a centre.

⁵ *O. c.* I, 352; II, 305, 308.

the dogma is not self-evident. If anything, the position is *à priori* improbable, for it is natural to look for different elements on which the distinction of subject-object which runs all through our mental life may be founded. The real source of the dogma is not, then, *à priori* probability, but the long-rejected sensualistic theory of knowledge. As for the asserted introspective evidence, it is not found by the unbiassed observer. Empirically, such an hypothesis can account neither for the connection of like feelings with entirely disparate classes of sensations, nor for the connection with complex processes of feelings which are the same in type as those accompanying simple sensations. To explain the unity of feeling, it has recourse to a hypothetical 'common-sense.'¹

The *Psychologie* adds nothing to the theory of feeling-qualities beyond a more explicit statement of the general position. Feelings have quality and intensity, and, besides these, other attributes due to their position in the unitary feeling-continuum, which is, as before, tri-dimensional. That is, their quality is a function of their place in these three dimensions, which we may accordingly call the *components* of feeling-quality. These components are not real feelings any more than the components of a motion are real motions, or than color-tone, brightness and saturation of a color-sensation are real sensations. Immediate introspection shows that they are "basal forms, each one of which includes a number of feeling-elements, but not concrete particular feelings, which reappear in unchanged quality in each single case to which we apply the names given to them." Thus, for example, the pleasure of the taste of sugar and that of the smell of menthol are alike in *direction*, but they are not at all *similar*.² The feeling-tone of a sensation depends for "its peculiar quality, specific for each sensation," upon the quality of that sensation.³

Nothing new is said concerning the criteria of feeling analysis, but it is important to note carefully what little is mentioned. Its methods are those of impression and expression, and in the former the sensation which is the *direct* result of the stimulus is used only as a means to arouse the feeling.⁴ Simple feelings are like simple sensations in the possibility of separating them from their connection by analysis, and in the fact that in this process they become in a sense abstractions.⁵ But while sensations can be abstracted from feelings, feelings cannot be abstracted from sensations.⁶ Of the two conditions for analysis which are mentioned in this work, therefore, 'independent variability' and the isolating effect of attention, the latter is not

¹ *O. c.* I, 352, 359-360.

² *O. c.* II, 305-308.

³ *O. c.* II, 318.

⁴ *O. c.* II, 263.

⁵ *O. c.* I, 308.

⁶ *O. c.* I, 352.

mentioned in connection with feeling analysis. This has already been emphasized in a different connection in the preceding paper. Simple feelings Wundt defines as those which cannot be separated into simple feelings appearing independently for themselves.¹ This definition connects itself quite clearly both with the general method of analysis and with the method of feeling-analysis, as it has been already described. The simple feeling is one which can appear for itself in changing relations to other mental content, but which cannot itself be divided by division of its sensational substrate, or, under the further refinement introduced in the *Grundriss*, by variation of the components of that substrate, if it happens to be a sensation belonging to one of the multidimensional systems. Finally, it is essential to remember that Wundt has already stated that feeling-tone is "specific for each sensation."²

To sum up, then, we find that in this last work the objective-subjective distinction between sensation and feeling is strongly emphasized. But it is given introspective content. The unitariness of the feeling-continuum is dwelt upon, as it was in the *Grundriss*; and to the first and third of the special characteristics of feeling there pointed out, there is added a further result of this unitariness, the tendency of feelings to fuse into a mass or total-feeling. This unity of feeling is referred to the unity of apperception; that is, to the unity of mental processes as a whole at any given moment.

The quality of a feeling is made a function of the three 'dimensions' of the feeling-manifold as components. Wundt's statement of pluralism remains as dogmatic as before. He has no hesitation in appealing in justification of his own position to that 'immediate self-observation' which he justly censures when employed by his opponents. But his explanation of the three 'directions' by connecting them with the three temporal aspects of mental process has disappeared, and in its stead he seems inclined to find an analogy in the three dimensions of the color-system.

In concluding, it does not seem necessary to restate what, as it seems to us, we must hold that Wundt means by the terms subjective and objective as applied to feelings and sensations respectively. His meaning is psychological, and he is not using an epistemological distinction, as Dr. Washburn supposes. Indeed, his meaning for 'subjective' includes as one of its elements just that lack of localization which the critic herself admits as part of its psychological meaning.³ With her conclusion that only the pleasantness-unpleasantness feelings fully satisfy the

¹ O. c. II, 305. ² Cf. ante. ³ Cf. *Phil. Rev.*, Jan., 1905, pp. 26 ff.

psychological definition of subjective, either in her own sense or in that broader one which we have outlined, we are inclined to agree; but that is a matter which does not concern us here.

Nor does it come within the province of this paper to discuss the validity of Wundt's grounds for separating feelings from sensations. But it is not, perhaps, over-captious to ask why the critic seems to slight the first of the three distinctions given in the *Grundriss*, that of movement between qualitative opposites, when pointing out the insufficiency of the second, upon which Wundt seems to lay no special stress, and which does not appear in the *Physiologische Psychologie*. Given Wundt's general position, the fact that he finds a certain class of conscious phenomena ranging in quality between conscious opposites, and falling into a unitary interconnectedness which can, as it were, indifferently include all the disparate systems of other elemental conscious phenomena, seems no insufficient reason for regarding that class as different in kind from these other phenomena. It must also be remembered that we have found his actual reasons for the distinction to be more inclusive than his explicit statement of them.

As to Wundt's theory of feeling-analysis, it seems to us that such a review as that just completed is almost indispensable to make one's view of it clear. As we have found, it depends on the method of impression and on that of expression. The latter method is, however, merely an auxiliary guide in the actual task of analysis. While we cannot isolate a feeling as an object of attention, yet we can isolate it mediately by the isolation of its perceptual substrate. Once isolated in this way, we attack it in the method of impression by varying, one at a time, the elements in that substrate. If in this way we can eliminate some of the aspects or constituents of the feeling, while retaining others, it is complex; but if we can make no such breach in it, it is—subjectively at least—unanalyzable. If, finally, we have come upon a feeling which has an elementary sensation as its basis, that feeling is, *ipso facto* and by the terms of our analysis, psychologically unanalyzable; for we can introduce no variation within its sensational stimulus. The only exception to this rule is in the case of the sensations belonging to multidimensional systems, such as light, where the possible variation of the components of the given sensation may establish a division in the feeling-tone.

Looking at the criticisms of Dr. Washburn's second article with these facts in mind, we see that Wundt would accept none of the three methods for establishing the simplicity of a feeling which she suggests as the only ones possible on his definition. The first two, that of appeal to introspection and that of appeal to the uniqueness of the sensational substrate, are incompatible

with his whole line of argument, as she herself points out. The third suggestion is, that we ground our distinction of the simple feelings from the complex "on our knowledge that the sensational source of the so-called simple feelings is simple, while the so-called complex feeling is derived from a complex sensational source."¹ This contains an element of Wundt's method, but a very partial element. Complexity of sensational source would not determine complexity of feeling for him. That would be a point to be settled by experimental variation in the elements of the complex sensational stimulus. On the other hand, when we have a sensational substrate not only simple, but also such that we cannot even vary its components—a sensation belonging to a one-dimensional system, for example—then we may be sure that the feeling attached to it is psychologically simple. For, as we have seen, the feeling of each sensation is specific for that sensation, and the invariable stimulus must produce invariable feeling-reaction. The feeling cannot, therefore, be duplicated elsewhere in experience, and no division can be introduced into it; and such a feeling is, for Wundt, simple.

It may be well, in closing, to sum up categorically the points on which we have found it necessary to take issue with the critic both here and in the preceding paper. Dr. Washburn's criticisms were: (1) It is not clear whether Wundt's criterion of analysis, independent *variability*, includes independent *existence*. (2) His criterion for the attributes, independence of the mental context, is insufficient to rule out clearness as an attribute. (3) His distinction between feelings as subjective and sensations as objective is epistemological and extra-psychological. (4) His reference of the unity of feeling to that of apperception, and his consequent definition of the simple feeling, make it impossible to distinguish between simple and complex feelings, save by reference to their sensational substrate.

But we have found that, when the whole development of Wundt's doctrine is examined, and the actual way in which he goes to work at his problem, none of these criticisms is valid. More specifically we find that (1) what marks off the element in Wundt's eyes *is* its separability, the fact, that is, that while no breach can be made in it, yet it can be experienced in different mental contexts. (2) Wundt has *four* criteria for the attributes, instead of merely one. These are structural necessity, independent variability, inseparable connection, and independence of the complex. He regards clearness as excluded

¹ *Phil. Rev.*, *ut ante*, p. 26.

by the last two of these. (3) The difference between feelings and sensations, as subjective and objective, is not for Wundt epistemological, as he has explicitly disclaimed his own earlier theory of that nature, but psychological; and he has given it introspective definition as a contrast between tendency to fusion and persistent discreteness. (4) Wundt's canon of analysis is the same for feelings as for sensations, though his method is necessarily different; and the reference to sensational substrate involved is never regarded as directly settling the question of the simplicity or compositeness of the feeling, which is on the contrary determined by experimental variation of that substrate considered as the feeling-stimulus.

Finally, it must be admitted that these criticisms are of real service in pointing out inadequacies in the immediate statements of Wundt on these matters. We have been able to find no single discussion of them in his works which was entirely clear and sufficient by itself. Such criticisms of method and definition are always useful in the case of authors who, like Wundt, have been constantly busied in a varied literary activity, and that in a science which has been too much occupied with growth to examine its presuppositions. They force his students at least to attempt to get a more precise idea of his meaning; and sometimes they elicit a final attempt at definition from the master himself. Such a result in this case would be most desirable.